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Abstract
We consider various lexicographic allocation procedures for coalitional games
with transferable utility where the payoffs are computed in an externally given
order of the players. The common feature of the methods is that if the allocation
is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We first investigate the general
relationships between these allocations and obtain two hierarchies on the class of
balanced games.
Secondly, we focus on assignment games and sharpen some of these general
relationships. Our main result is the coincidence of the sets of lemarals (vectors
of lexicographic maxima over the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors),
lemacols (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the core) and extreme core points.
As byproducts, we show that, similarly to the core and the coalitionally rational
payoff set, also the dual coalitionally rational payoff set of an assignment game is
determined by the individual and mixed-pair coalitions, and present an efficient
and elementary way to compute these basic dual coalitional values. This provides
a way to compute the Alexia value (the average of all lemacols) with no need to
obtain the whole coalitional function of the dual assignment game.
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1 Introduction
Assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) are models of assignment (two-sided
matching) markets with transferable utilities where the aim of each player on one side is
to form a profitable coalition with a player on the other side. Since only such bilateral
cooperations are worthy, these games are completely defined by the matrix containing
the cooperative worths of all possible pairings of players from the two sides.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that the core of an assignment game is precisely
the set of dual optimal solutions to the assignment optimization problem on the un-
derlying matrix of mixed-pair profits. This result not only implies that all assignment
games have non-empty core but also that the core can be determined without explic-
itly generating the entire coalitional function of the game. Typically, the core of the
assignment game contains infinitely many allocations which makes necessary some core
selection.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is a well-known single-valued solution for coali-
tional games with transferable utility. This value is the average of the marginal payoff
vectors, where the marginal payoff vector associated with a given ordering of the set
of agents is defined by paying to each agent his marginal contribution to the set of
predecessors in the ordering. In an assignment game, each extreme core allocation is a
marginal payoff vector (Hamers et al., 2002). However, the converse is not true and this
is why the Shapley value of an assignment game may not select a core allocation.
Another single-valued solution for coalitional games (with a non-empty core) is the
Alexia value (Tijs et al., 2011), that is defined as the average of the lexicographical
maximum core allocations or lemacolsa. Given an order of the agents, the corresponding
lemacol is recursively defined by paying to each agent the maximum he can obtain
inside the core under the restriction that his predecessors in the order have already been
paid their restricted maxima. By its definition, the Alexia value always selects a core
allocation. For convex games (Shapley, 1971), lemacols and the marginal worth vectors
coincide.
For arbitrary transferable utility (TU) games, we obtain that when a marginal worth
vector is in the core, it coincides with the corresponding lemiral (the vector of lexi-
cograhic minima over the set of coalitionally rational payoff vectors) and also with the
lemaral (the vector of lexicographic maxima over the set of dual coalitionally rational
payoffs) associated to the reverse order of the players. Similarly, if a lemiral / lemaral is
in the core, it coincides with the corresponding lemicol / lemacol (the vector of the lexi-
cograhically minimized / maximized payoffs over the core). The roles of the allocations
in these implications are not symmetric.
For assignment games in general, not all lemirals are in the core.b We find, however,
that if we consider the lemarals, all of them are extreme core points. To prove that, we
first show that to obtain the set of payoff vectors where each coalition is paid at most
aLemacols are named lexinals in (Tijs et al., 2011). We change the name trying to find a common
nomenclature that includes the lexicographic minimization over the core and also the lexicographic min-
imization (respectively maximization) over the set of coalitionally rational payoff vectors (respectively
over the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors), where efficiency is not required.
bIzquierdo et al. (2007) show that in an assignment game all the lemirals are extreme core points if
and only if the game is exact, or alternatively, if the game has a large core.
2
its marginal contribution to the grand coalition (the dual coalitional value), it is enough
to consider the marginal contributions of individuals and mixed-pairs. Moreover, these
upper bounds for the core payoffs can be obtained from the initial matrix of mixed-pair
valuations with no need of solving optimization problems.
The coincidence between the set of lemarals and the set of extreme core points
implies that lemarals coincide with the corresponding lemacols. This provides a way of
computing the Alexia value of an assignment game with no need to obtain the entire
coalitional function of the dual game.
The paper is organized as follows. After some general preliminaries on TU games,
in Section 3 we establish some relationships between different lexicographic allocations.
In Section 4 we introduce assignment games and recall known results regarding their
extreme core points. Finally, in Section 5 we prove that assignment games are not only
ONTO-lemaral (all core extreme points are lemarals) but also INTO-lemaral games (all
lemarals are core extreme points), which means that the set of extreme core allocations
coincides with the set of lemarals. Section 6 concludes with a remark regarding the
computation of the Alexia value in assignment games.
2 General preliminaries on games
A transferable utility cooperative game on the nonempty finite set N of players is defined
by a coalitional function w : 2N → R satisfying w(∅) = 0. The function w specifies the
worth of every coalition S ⊆ N .
Given a game (N,w), a payoff allocation x ∈ RN is called efficient, if x(N) = w(N);
individually rational, if xi = x({i}) ≥ w({i}) for all i ∈ N ; coalitionally rational, if
x(S) ≥ w(S) for all S ⊆ N ; where, by the standard notation, x(S) = ∑i∈S xi if S 6= ∅,
and x(∅) = 0. We denote by I(N,w) the imputation set (i.e., the set of efficient and
individually rational payoffs), and by C(N,w) the core (i.e., the set of efficient and
coalitionally rational payoffs) of the game (N,w). A game is balanced, if its core is not
empty, and totally balanced, if every subgame is balanced. A (balanced) game is exact,
if for each S ⊆ N there exists a core element x such that x(S) = w(S). A (balanced)
game has a large core, if for any coalitionally rational allocation y with y(N) > v(N)
there exists a core element x such that xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ N .
Let the collection B ⊆ 2N contain all essential coalitions in the game (i.e. for
each S ∈ 2N \ B there is a proper partition {S1, . . . , Sr} ⊆ B, r ≥ 2, of S such that
w(S) ≤ ∑rj=1w(Sj) holds), then it is clear that the core is completely determined by
such a collection B and the grand coalition N , i.e.
C(N,w) = {x ∈ RN : x(N) = w(N), x(S) ≥ w(S) ∀S ∈ B} . (1)
There are many classes of balanced games discussed extendedly in the literature (the
class of assignment games is a prime example) for which the efficient computability of
the core and related solutions relies on the existence of such a family B consisting of
only polynomial many coalitions.
An order on the player set N is a bijection σ : {1, 2, . . . , n} → N , where for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, σi = σ(i) is the player that occupies position i. The set of predecessors
of agent k ∈ N in the ordering σ is P σk = {j ∈ N | σ−1(j) < σ−1(k)}. For each order
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σ on the player set of game (N,w), a marginal payoff vector mσ,w is defined as follows:
for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} let mw,σσi = w(P σσi ∪{σi})−w(P σσi). Marginal payoff vectors are
efficient, but they may not be in the core. However, if a marginal payoff vector is in the
core then it is an extreme core point.
There exist in the literature other types of payoff vectors, that also sequentially al-
locate payoffs following a given order on the player set, but do not modify the payoffs
already allocated to predecessor players. We discuss several variants of such “lexico-
graphic” payoff vectors in this paper.
For a balanced game (N,w) and an order σ on the player set N , the σ-lemacol
λ
σ,w ∈ RN is defined (Tijs et al., 2011)c as the lexicographical maximum on C(N,w)
with respect to σ, that is, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, let
λ
σ,w
σi
= max
{
xσi : x ∈ C(N,w), xσl = λ
σ,w
σl
for all l ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}
}
.
It is straightforward to notice that every lemacol is an extreme point of the core. On
the other hand, not all extreme core points of an arbitrary balanced game need to be
lemacols, as an example in (Tijs et al., 2011) or Example 5 below demonstrates.
Then, for a balanced game (N,w), the Alexia value α(w) is defined as the average
of all lemacols:
α(w) =
1
|N |!
∑
σ∈Π(N)
λ
σ,w
,
where Π(N) denotes the set of orders over the player set N . Non-cooperative and
axiomatic characterizations for the Alexia valued as a single-valued core selector for
balanced games are given by Kongo et al. (2010).
We can also define, for each order σ on the player set of balanced game (N,w), the
payoff vector of lexicographical minima over the core, the σ-lemicol λσ,w ∈ RN : for each
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, let
λσ,wσi = min
{
xσi : x ∈ C(N,w), xσl = λσ,wσl for all l ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}
}
. (2)
In (Tijs et al., 2011) these payoff vectors of lexicographical minima are called reverse
lexinals and their average the reverse Alexia value.
The lemicols can be obtained by solving sequences of linear programming problems,
but, as it also happens with the lemacols, we do not have a closed (even if iterative)
formula for their computation. Trying to overcome this difficulty, we may not require
efficiency and consider, instead of the core, the set of coalitionally rational payoff vectors
denoted by
R(N,w) = {x ∈ RN : x(S) ≥ w(S) ∀S ⊆ N} .
We consider a simple procedure to compute ‘as small as possible’ coalitionally rational
payoff vectors in hoping to get an efficient one, i.e. a core element. Similar to the way
cThese lexicographical maximum vectors over the core are called lexinals in (Tijs et al., 2011) and
leximals in (Kongo et al., 2010).
dThe Alexia value is called AL-value in (Kongo et al., 2010).
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we get a marginal payoff vector, we compute the payoffs according to an externally given
priority order of the players.
Given a game (N,w), for an order σ of the players, the σ-lemiral vector rσ,w ∈ RN
is defined as follows: for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
rσ,wσi = min
{
xσi : x ∈ R(N,w), xσl = rσ,wσl ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}
}
, (3)
which trivially leads to
rσ,wσi = max
{
w(Q ∪ {σi})− rσ,w(Q) : Q ⊆ P σσi
}
. (4)
It is straightforward to notice that, as it happens with the core, only essential coalitions
are needed to define R(N,w), which means that, if B is a set which contains all essential
coalitions for (N,w), then the σ-lemiral vector is in fact
rσ,wσi = max
{
w(Q ∪ {σi})− rσ,w(Q) : Q ⊆ P σσi ∩ B
}
. (5)
We emphasize that this simplification could provide polynomial time computability for
each σ-lemiral vector for some special classes of games.
Obviously, rw,σσ1 = w(σ1), the minimum payoff to player σ1 in any coalitionally ra-
tional payoff vector. Similarly, for any i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, the amount rw,σσi is the smallest
possible payoff needed to satisfy all rσ,w(Q ∪ {σi}) ≥ w(Q ∪ σi) rationality inequali-
ties for coalitions containing only σi and his predecessors, given the already determined
conditionally minimal coalitionally rational payoffs. Thus, the lemiral vector rσ,w is the
lexicographical minimum on coalitionally rational payoff vectors in w with respect to
σ, explaining its ‘name’. In general, we will name σ-lexicographic allocations those sets
of vectors that, given an order σ on the player set, are defined following a procedure of
lexicographical minima or maxima over a given set of payoff vectors.
For any position i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Qi ⊆ P σσi denote a maximizing coalition in
(4). The lemiral rσ,w satisfies all inequalities in the system x ∈ RN , x(Qi ∪ {σi}) ≥
w(Qi ∪ {σi}), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as equalities. Since the coefficient matrix is ‘triangular’,
hence invertible, the lemiral rσ,w is an extreme element of the convex polyhedral set
R(N,w). It follows that if rσ,w is efficient then it is an extreme element of the core,
rσ,w ∈ ext C(N,w). This is another similarity to the marginal allocation procedure: if
the outcome is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core.
3 Some relationships for σ-lexicographic allocations
We have seen so far that the aforementioned σ-lexicographical allocations present several
similarities. In this section we analyze under which circumstances these similarities
become a coincidence. Later on, new σ-lexicographic allocations are introduced by
considering the dual game.
Moreover, we are interested in classes of games where either all extreme core payoff
vectors belong to one of the defined classes of σ-lexicographic allocations, or conversely,
all outcomes of a given σ-lexicographic procedure are extreme core allocations. To this
end, we introduce the following definition.
A balanced game (N,w) is called
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• ONTO-marginal (or ONTO-lemacol, or ONTO-lemicol, or ONTO-lemiral) if all
its extreme core points are marginal payoff vectors (or lemacols, or lemicols, or
lemirals, respectively).
• INTO-marginal (or INTO-lemacol, or INTO-lemicol, or INTO-lemiral) if all mar-
ginal payoff vectors (or lemacols, or lemicols, or lemirals, respectively) are extreme
core points of (N,w).
There are some known classes of ONTO-marginal games: convex games (Shapley,
1971), information graph games (Kuipers, 1993) and assignment games (Hamers et al.,
2002). Contrary to that, the class of exact games, which contains the class of convex
games, is not ONTO-marginal. In fact, there are exact games where none of its extreme
core points are marginal payoff vectors (see e.g. Example 1 below). Precisely the same
statements can be made about another superset of convex games: the class of games
with a large core.
Convex games are also INTO-marginal games (Shapley, 1971). Moreover, the prop-
erty INTO-marginal characterizes the class of convex games (Ichiishi, 1981). A similar
characterization of the INTO-lemiral balanced games is not known to us. The examples
in this paper and the strong similarities of the lemirals and the lexicographic allocations
used by van Gellekom et al. (1999) to characterize largeness of the core suggest to us the
coincidence of these two classes of games. Some of the results in (Este´vez-Ferna´ndez,
2012) also seem to support this conjecture.
We now show that the property ONTO-marginal implies ONTO-lemiral and some
other properties, as a consequence of the next and subsequent propositions.
Proposition 1 In a game (N,w), for any ordering σ of the players, mσ,w ∈ C(N,w) if
and only if mσ,w = rσ,w.
Proof. If mσ,w = rσ,w, then since mσ,w is efficient and rσ,w is coalitionally rational,
we trivially obtain that this payoff vector belongs to the core. We prove the converse
implication inductively, according to the order σ. Trivially, without any condition,
mσ,wσ1 = w(σ1) = r
σ,w
σ1
.
For arbitrary i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we assume to have mσ,wσj = rσ,wσj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1,
implying mσ,w(Q) = rσ,w(Q) for all Q ⊆ P σσi . Since mσ,w ∈ C(N,w), we have mσ,wσi ≥
w(Q ∪ {σi})−mσ,w(Q) = w(Q ∪ {σi})− rσ,w(Q) for all Q ⊂ P σσi . By definition, mσ,wσi =
w(P σσi ∪{σi})−mσ,w(P σσi) = w(P σσi ∪{σi})−rσ,w(P σσi), implying that P σσi is a maximizing
coalition in (4). Hence, mσ,wσi = r
σ,w
σi
. 
Proposition 1 implies that if for an ordering the associated marginal vector is in
the core, so does the associated lemiral vector. The following example shows that the
converse implication needs not hold.
Example 1 Consider the following 4-player, symmetric game:
v(S) =

0 if |S| ≤ 1
3 if |S| = 2
5 if |S| = 3
10 if |S| = 4.
6
It is easily checked that for the order σ = (1, 2, 3, 4), the lemiral vector rσ,v = (0, 3, 3, 4)
is a core element, but the associated marginal vector mσ,v = (0, 3, 2, 5) is not. In fact,
none of the marginal vectors (that are the permutations of (0, 3, 2, 5)) is in the core, but
all the lemirals are. Indeed, for any order, the lemiral payoff to the first player is 0, to
the second and to the third player it is 3, and to the last player the payoff is 4. Thus, for
all orders, the associated lemiral vector is an (extreme) element of the core, i.e. this is
an INTO-lemiral game. The core, however, has other vertices, e.g. the vector (1, 2, 2, 5)
and all of its permuted variants are also extreme elements of the core, i.e. this game is
not ONTO-lemiral.
For sake of comparison with a positive result on assignment games (Izquierdo et al.,
2007; cf. next section), we observe that the family of extreme core vectors (0, 3, 3, 4),
(1, 2, 2, 5) and their permuted variants make all coalitional rationality inequalities tight,
so this game is an exact game, or equivalently for totally balanced symmetric games
(Biswas et al., 1999), this game has a large core. 
The lemiral and the lemicol vectors are determined on two different — although for
balanced games closely related — sets of payoffs. In general, already the first player
in an order can receive different payoffs in the lemiral and in the lemicol allocations.
The following proposition states when requiring efficiency of the allocation makes no
difference.
Proposition 2 In a game (N,w) for any ordering σ of the players, rσ,w ∈ C(N,w) if
and only if λσ,w = rσ,w.
Proof. The lemicol vectors are in the core by definition, so the “if” direction needs no
explanation.
We show the “only if” direction inductively, according to the order σ. Trivially,
λσ,wσ1 ≥ rσ,wσ1 = w(σ1). Now, if rσ,w ∈ C(N,w) then the core minimum payoff to player σ1
must be rσ,wσ1 .
For arbitrary i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we assume to have λσ,wσj = rσ,wσj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1.
Then by comparing the minimization problems in (2) and (3), we get λσ,wσi ≥ rσ,wσi . Here
again, rσ,w ∈ C(N,w) implies that the conditional core minimum payoff to player σi
must be rσ,wσi , concluding the inductive step. 
Applied to the game in Example 1, Proposition 2 implies that the set of lemicol
vectors consists of the vector (0, 3, 3, 4) and its permuted variants. In this example, all
lemirals belong to the core, but this needs not always be the case, as the next example
shows. It also demonstrates that the roles of lemirals and lemicols in Proposition 2 are
not interchangeable.
Example 2 Consider the following 4-player, symmetric game:
v(S) =

0 if |S| ≤ 1
4 if |S| = 2
5 if |S| = 3
8 if |S| = 4.
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The core of this game is a singleton, C(N, v) = {(2, 2, 2, 2)}. If we take the order
σ = (1, 2, 3, 4) and compute the corresponding lemiral, we find rσ,v = (0, 4, 4, 4), which
is not in the core. 
The combination of the two above propositions leads to a similar connection between
marginal payoff vectors and lemicols.
Corollary 1 In a game (N,w), for any ordering σ of the players, mσ,w ∈ C(N,w) if
and only if mσ,w = λσ,w.
Proof: The “if” part is obvious since lemicols belong to the core by definition. For
the “only if” part, notice that if mσ,w ∈ C(N,w), Proposition 1 implies mσ,w = rσ,w and
hence rσ,w ∈ C(N,w). Then, Proposition 2 implies mσ,w = rσ,w = λσ,w. 
In the above corollary the roles of the marginal payoff vector and that of the lemicol
are not interchangeable. The lemicols always belong to the core by definition, while it is
easy to find examples where some marginal payoff vector is not a core allocation. Take
for instance Example 1 where none of the marginal payoff vectors belongs to the core.
The following hierarchy of the properties summarizes our results presented so far:
for any game
ONTO-marginal ⇒ ONTO-lemiral ⇒ ONTO-lemicol.
As a consequence, for convex games, information graph games and assignment games,
all extreme core allocations are not only marginal payoff vectors but also lemirals and
lemicols.
Notice that the 4-player, exact, symmetric game in Example 1 is not ONTO-lemicol.
Indeed, the extreme core point (1,2,2,5) is not a lemicol since the first player in any order
should get 0. However, (1,2,2,5) is the lemacol related to the reverse order σ = (4, 3, 2, 1)
of the players. In order to look for new relationships between the lemacols and other
lexicographic allocations we need to introduce some new notions.
SinceR(N,w) is not bounded above, we do not propose a lexicographic maximization
over this set of coalitionally rational payoffs. We now define a set of payoff vectors
supported by a similar “rationality” requirement: instead of imposing that no coalition
receives less than its coalitional value, we require that no coalition receives more than its
dual coalitional value, i.e. its contribution to the grand coalition. Given a game (N,w),
we name this set of payoffs the set of dual coalitionally rational payoffs and write
R∗(N,w) = {x ∈ RN : x(S) ≤ w(N)− w(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N} .
Given a game (N,w), the game (N,w∗) defined by w∗(S) = w(N) − w(N \ S) for all
S ⊆ N is known in the literature as the dual game and thus inspires our definition of the
dual coalitionally rational payoffs. Notice that w∗(∅) = 0 and w∗(N) = w(N) for any
game (N,w). It follows that, under efficiency, the sets of coalitionally rational payoffs
and of dual coalitionally rational payoffs coincide and also coincide with the core. In
other words, the core of any coalitional game coincides with the anticore of its dual
game, that is,
C(N,w) = C∗(N,w∗) := {x ∈ RN : x(N) = w∗(N), x(S) ≤ w∗(S) ∀S ⊆ N}. (6)
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As it happens with the core and the set of coalitionally rational payoff vectors, for
certain games, some coalitions may be redundant in the definition of the anticore and of
the dual coalitionally rational payoff set. A coalition S is called inessential in the dual
of a game (N,w) if it has a proper partition in non-empty coalitions S1, . . . , Sk, k ≥ 2,
such that w∗(S) ≥ w∗(S1) + . . .+w∗(Sk). Notice that if a coalition is inessential in the
dual game, it is redundant for the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors and
for the anticore. Then the analogous statement to (1) easily follows: let the collection
D ⊆ 2N contain all essential coalitions in the dual game (N,w∗), then the core of the
game is completely determined by efficiency and such a collection D, i.e.
C(N,w) = C∗(N,w∗) = {x ∈ RN : x(N) = w∗(N), x(T ) ≤ w∗(T ) ∀T ∈ D} .
In the second part of this paper, we identify such a family D consisting of quadratic
many coalitions for assignment games.
Over the set R∗(N,w) of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors, we propose a
lexicographic maximization procedure. Given a game (N,w), for an order σ of the
players, the σ-lemaral vector rσ,w ∈ RN is defined as follows: for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
rσ,wσi = max
{
xσi : x ∈ R∗(N,w), xσl = rσ,wσl ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}
}
,
which trivially leads to
rσ,wσi = min
{
w∗(Q ∪ {σi})− rσ,w(Q) : Q ⊆ P σσi
}
. (7)
The counterpart of statement (5) is as follows: if the collection D ⊆ 2N contains all
essential coalitions in the dual game (N,w∗), then
rσ,wσi = min
{
w∗(Q ∪ {σi})− rσ,w(Q) : Q ⊆ P σσi ∩ D
}
. (8)
As we will see below, for assignment games this reduction could provide polynomial
time computability for each σ-lemaral vector.
The next proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 1 as it states that ONTO-
marginal also implies ONTO-lemaral. Given any order σ ∈ Π(N), let us define the
reverse order σ∗ ∈ Π(N) by σ∗i = σn−i+1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proposition 3 In a game (N,w), for any ordering σ of the players, mσ,w ∈ C(N,w) if
and only if mσ,w = rσ
∗,w.
Proof. The “if” part is obvious since whenever a lemaral is efficient it belongs to the
core.
Let us prove the “only if” implication. Assume that for some σ ∈ Π(N), mσ,w ∈
C(N,w). Observe first of all that since the marginal vector satisfies mσ,w({σ1, . . . , σn−k})
= w({σ1, . . . , σn−k}) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, it also satisfies
mσ,w({σ∗1, . . . , σ∗k}) = w∗({σ∗1, . . . , σ∗k}) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. (9)
Then, trivially from (7), without any condition, mσ,wσ∗1 = w
∗ ({σ∗1}) = rσ
∗,w
σ∗1
.
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For arbitrary i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we assume to have mσ,wσ∗j = r
σ∗,w
σ∗j
for all 1 ≤ j ≤
i − 1, implying mσ,w(Q) = rσ∗,w(Q) for all Q ⊆ P σ∗σ∗i . Since mσ,w ∈ C(N,w), we have
mσ,wσ∗i ≤ w∗(Q ∪ {σ∗i })−mσ,w(Q) = w∗(Q ∪ {σ∗i })− rσ
∗,w(Q) for all Q ⊂ P σ∗σ∗i . It follows
from (9) and the inductive assumption that mσ,wσ∗i = w
∗(P σ
∗
σ∗i
∪ {σ∗i }) − mσ,w(P σ∗σ∗i ) =
w∗(P σ
∗
σ∗i
∪{σ∗i })− rσ∗,w(P σ∗σ∗i ), implying that P σ
∗
σ∗i
is a minimizing coalition in (7). Hence,
mσ,wσ∗i = r
σ∗,w
σ∗i
. 
Notice that the roles of lemarals and marginals in the above proposition are not
interchangeable. For instance, in Example 1, the lemaral corresponding to order σ =
(1, 2, 3, 4) is rσ,w = (5, 2, 2, 1), which belongs to the core. In fact all lemarals are obtained
by permuting the components of this payoff vector. However, recall that for this game
no marginal payoff vector is in the core.
We now prove the counterpart of Proposition 2, namely that property ONTO-lemaral
implies ONTO-lemacol.
Proposition 4 In a game (N,w), for any ordering σ of the players, rσ,w ∈ C(N,w) if
and only if λ
σ,w
= rσ,w.
Proof. Since all lemacol payoff vectors are core elements by definition, whenever a
lemacol equals a lemaral, this lemaral payoff vector belongs to the core. To see the
converse statement, notice first that rσ,wσ1 = w
∗({σ1}) = λσ,wσ1 . Assume now that for all
1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1 it holds rσ,wσj = λ
σ,w
σj
. Then,
rσ,wσi = min
{
w∗(Q ∪ {σi})− rσ,w(Q) : Q ⊆ P σσi
} ≥ λσ,wσi ,
where the inequality follows since λ
σ,w ∈ C(N,w). On the other hand, since we assume
rσ,w ∈ C(N,w), the definition of λσ,w and the fact that rσ,wσj = λ
σ,w
σj
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1,
implies the converse inequality rσ,wσi ≤ λ
σ,w
σi
. Hence we get rσ,wσi = λ
σ,w
σi
. 
To see that the roles of lemarals and lemacols cannot be interchanged in the above
proposition, consider the dual of the game in Example 2:
v∗(S) =

0 if |S| = 0
3 if |S| = 1
4 if |S| = 2
8 if |S| ≥ 3.
Given the order σ = (1, 2, 3, 4), the corresponding lemaral payoff vector is rσ,v =
(3, 1, 1, 1) which is not a core element. Nevertheless, by definition, all lemacols belong
to the core.
To get the counterpart of Corollary 2, we combine the two last propositions to show
that ONTO-marginal also implies ONTO-lemacol.
Corollary 2 In a game (N,w) for any ordering σ of the players, mσ,w ∈ C(N,w) if
and only if mσ,w = λ
σ∗,w
.
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Proof. If for some σ, mσ,w ∈ C(N,w), Proposition 3 implies that mσ,w = rσ∗,w ∈
C(N,w). Now, Proposition 4 guarantees that rσ∗,w = λσ∗,w and hence mσ,w = λσ∗,w.
The converse implication is straightforward. 
We finish this section by highlighting the hierarchy of the properties related to the
lexicographic maximization allocations: for any game
ONTO-marginal ⇒ ONTO-lemaral ⇒ ONTO-lemacol.
As a consequence, for convex games, information graph games and assignment games,
all extreme core allocations are not only marginal payoff vectors but also lemarals and
lemacols.
4 Assignment games
From now on we focus on a particular class of balanced games, namely on the class of
assignment games. Taken into account that assignment games are also ONTO-marginal
(Hamers et al., 2002), we get from the general implications proved in Propositions 1-4
that assignment games are ONTO-lemiral/lemaral/lemicol/lemacol. Since any balanced
game is INTO-lemicol/lemacol by definition, we will focus on the INTO-lemiral/lemaral
properties for assignment games. We first recall some known related results in this
section.
Given two disjoint finite sets S and T , we call µ ⊆ S × T an (S, T )-assignment, if it
is a bijection from some S ′ ⊆ S to some T ′ ⊆ T such that |S ′| = |T ′| = min(|S|, |T |).
Trivially, µ = ∅, if S = ∅ or T = ∅. We shall write (i, j) ∈ µ as well as µ(i) = j.
We denote byM(S, T ) the set of all (S, T )-assignments. Obviously,M(S, T ) = {∅}, if
S = ∅ or T = ∅.
A game (N,w) is called an assignment game, if there exists a partition N = I ∪ J ,
I ∩ J = ∅, of the player set and a non-negative matrix A = [aij]i∈I,j∈J such that
w(S) = wA(S) := max
µ∈M(S∩I,S∩J)
∑
(i,j)∈µ
aij for all S ⊆ N.
A matching µ ∈M(S ∩ I, S ∩J) such that wA(S) =
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij is an optimal matching.
Due to the non-negativity of A, we can (and will) assume w.l.o.g. that any optimal
matching is a complete matching for the ‘short side’ of the coalition. We denote by
M∗A(S ∩ I, S ∩ J) the set of optimal matchings for coalition S. A player in I or J
is called a row or column player, respectively. Coalitions containing one row and one
column player are called mixed-pair coalitions. It is clear that
wA(S) =

0 if S ⊆ I or S ⊆ J
aij if S = {i, j}, i ∈ I, j ∈ J∑
(i,j)∈µ
aij for some µ ∈M(S ∩ I, S ∩ J) otherwise.
It follows that the collection
B = {{i} : i ∈ I} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ J} ∪ {{i, j} : i ∈ I, j ∈ J} (10)
11
contains all essential coalitions in any assignment game with player set I∪J , irrespective
of the matrix A. Shapley and Shubik (1972) proved that with the collection B given
in (10) the simplified description (1) of the core of any assignment game is nonempty,
hence assignment games are always balanced.
First, by adding dummy player(s) (i.e. zero rows/columns to the matrix A), we can
assume without loss of generality that there are the same number of players of both
types (i.e. the underlying data matrix A is square). It is well known that the core
has the dummy-player property, consequently at any core allocation of the augmented
assignment game, all dummy players receive their individual values of 0.
In order to obtain a unified notation, we introduce a fictitious row player and a
fictitious column player, and consider a single-player coalition as a fictitious mixed-pair
coalition consisting of the ‘real’ player and the fictitious one of the other type. Moreover,
we identify the mixed-pair coalitions with the ordered pairs of the two players, always
the row player written first. More formally, (i, j) denotes the ‘real’ mixed-pair coalition
{i, j}, i ∈ I, j ∈ J ; we write (i, 0) for single-player coalition {i}, i ∈ I, and (0, j) for {j},
j ∈ J ; finally, (0, 0) denotes the coalition of the two fictitious players. To capture the
relevant part of the original coalitional function wA needed for the simplified description
(1) of its core, we augment the original (square) data matrix with entries ai0 = 0 for
all i ∈ I, also a0j = 0 for all j ∈ J , finally a00 = 0. Since the type of the players is
determined by their positions in the ordered pairs, it will be convenient to use a common
set M0 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m} of indices, where m = |I| = |J |.
In what remains of the paper, we assume that the rows and columns of the augmented
(square) data matrix are arranged such that the diagonal assignment {(i, i) : i ∈M0} is
of maximum value, i.e. wA(I ∪ J) =
∑m
i=1 aii, because, by definition, a00 = 0.
To emphasize the bipartite nature of assignment games, we shall write the payoff
allocations as (u, v) ∈ RM0 × RM0 , but we always require u0 = v0 = 0 to hold.
With all the above conventions, the core of the assignment game (N,wA) induced
by matrix A is
C(N,wA) =
{
(u, v) : ui + vi = aii ∀ i ∈M0, ui + vj ≥ aij ∀ i 6= j ∈M0
}
. (11)
Subclasses of assignment games were identified by properties of the underlying ma-
trices by Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) who proved that an assignment game is exact
if and only if it has a large core. Moreover, if the underlying A is a square matrix with
an optimal matching placed on the diagonal then both of these game properties are
equivalent to the matrix property:
aij + akk ≥ aik + akj for all i, j, k ∈M0, (12)
that can be checked efficiently.
Izquierdo et al. (2007) defined the so-called max-payoff vectors for assignment games,
and proved that
• in any assignment game all core extreme points are max-payoff vectors;
• all max-payoff vectors are extreme points of the core if and only if the assignment
game is exact (equivalently, has a large core).
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It is straightforward to note that the max-payoff vectors are precisely the lemiral vectors
specialized for assignment games (only the single-player and the mixed-pair coalitions
are considered, but the underlying idea of satisfying the rationality constraints with
lexicographically minimum payoffs is the same). Hence, in our terminology, Izquierdo
et al. (2007) proved that
• all assignment games are ONTO-lemiral, (this can also be deduced from our
Proposition 1 by taking into account that assignment games are ONTO-marginal
(Hamers et al., 2002)),
• an assignment game is INTO-lemiral if and only if it is exact (equivalently, has a
large core).
It is interesting to compare these results with Example 1 in the previous section, where
an exact symmetric game is also INTO-lemiral but not ONTO-lemiral.
Notice that among the above discussed σ-lexicographic allocations the only ones that
satisfy both the ONTO and INTO properties for all assignment games, are the lemacols
and the lemicols. These allocations, however, are not easy to compute, mainly due to
the pairwise efficiency equalities required for core vectors. The lemiral (max-payoff)
vectors are easier to compute but they are guaranteed to be in the core only under the
exactness condition (12). In the next section we focus on the lemaral vectors and prove
that these also easier-to-compute allocations characterize the extreme points of the core
in all assignment games.
5 Lemaral payoff vectors and dual assignment games
It is well known that the core of any coalitional game coincides with the anticore of its
dual game (cf. (6)). For assignment games, Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz et al. (2011) showed
that in the usual description (11) of the core the lower bound inequalities ui + vj ≥
aij = wA((i, j)) related to i 6= j mixed pairs can be replaced with the dual upper bound
inequalities ui + vj ≤ w∗A((i, j)), while maintaining efficiency for the grand coalition
and non-negativity for the individual payoffs. Since obviously w∗A ((i, i)) = aii for all
i ∈ M , and w∗A(N) =
∑m
i=1 aii, it easily follows that the grand efficiency constraint
u(I) +v(J) = wA(N) = w
∗
A(N) can also be replaced by the pairwise efficiency equalities
ui + vi = w
∗
A((i, i)) = aii for all i ∈M . It is not difficult to see (for brevity, however, we
omit the details) that under efficiency this dualization process can be completed by also
replacing the non-negativity restrictions for the individual payoffs with the individual
dual constraints ui ≤ w∗A((i, 0)) ∀ i ∈ M and vj ≤ w∗A((0, j)) ∀ j ∈ M , and thus obtain
the purely dual counterpart of (11).
C(wA) =
{
(u, v) : ui+vi = w
∗
A(i, i) ∀ i ∈M0, ui+vj ≤ w∗A(i, j) ∀ i 6= j ∈M0
}
. (13)
Without the efficiency constraint(s), however, it is not at all obvious whether the larger
coalitions could still be omitted and such a small size description (using only quadratic
many constraints) could also be obtained for the set of dual coalitionally rational payoffs
in assignment games.
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Interestingly, all the aformentioned core upper bounds are known to be tight. Both
Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) proved that all individual contributions to the
grand coalition are attained in the core of the assignment game. Moreover, Nu´n˜ez
and Rafels (2002) showed that for each ‘real’ mixed pair (i, j) ∈ I × J the upper bound
wA(N)−wA(N \{i, j}) = w∗A ((i, j)) of their total payoff is also attained in the core. This
is a major difference with the usual individual or mixed-pair lower bounds ui + vj ≥ aij
for (i, j) ∈ M0 × M0, for some of these may not be attained in the core. Precisely
the unconditional tightness of these dual upper bounds suggests that maybe the set of
lemarals coincides with the set of extreme core allocations, with no need of requiring
exactness as we must do for the lemirals. To give an affirmative answer to this question,
we prove first that in the definition of the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors
of the assignment game only individual and mixed-pair coalitions are needed.
Theorem 1 Let (N,wA) be an assignment game. For all S ⊆ I ∪ J there exists a
partition of S in S1, S2, . . . , Sr ∈ B such that
w∗(S) ≥
r∑
k=1
w∗(Sk),
where collection B is defined in (10).
Proof. Let A be square and assume also without loss of generality that |S∩I| ≥ |S∩J |,
otherwise interchange the roles of i and j in this proof. Let µ be an optimal (complete)
matching for the grand coalition, µ ∈ M∗A(I, J), and let µ′ be an optimal matching for
the complement T := N \ S of coalition S (complete for its short side T ∩ I), that is
µ′ ∈M∗A(T ∩ I, T ∩ J). We first present two remarks.
If there is some i ∈ S ∩ I with µ(i) ∈ S or j ∈ S ∩ J with µ−1(j) ∈ S, denote by S˜
the subset of S with this property, i.e.
S˜ = {k ∈ S matched by µ to another agent in S}
and define N ′ = N \ S˜ and S ′ = S \ S˜. Then,
w∗A(S) = wA(N)− wA(N \ S) =
∑
k∈S˜∩I
akµ(k) + wA(N
′)− wA(N ′ \ S ′). (14)
Since for all k ∈ S˜ ∩ I, akµ(k) = wA(N)− wA(N \ {k, µ(k)}) = w∗A({k, µ(k)}), equation
(14) means that we can restrict our attention to the case where for all k ∈ S ∩ I,
µ(k) 6∈ S, in fact, µ(k) ∈ T ∩ J .
Similarly, if µ(i) = µ′(i) holds for some i ∈ I \ S = T ∩ I, or µ−1(j) = µ′−1(j) holds
for some j ∈ J \ S = T ∩ J , we denote by Sˆ the set of agents with this property, i.e.
Sˆ = {k ∈ T = N \ S with the same partner by µ and µ′}.
Then,
w∗(S) = w(N)− w(N \ S)
=
∑
i∈Sˆ∩I
aiµ(i) + w(N \ Sˆ)−
∑
i∈Sˆ∩I
aiµ(i) + w((N \ Sˆ) \ S)

= w(N \ Sˆ)− w((N \ Sˆ) \ S).
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So, again, we can assume without loss of generality that for all k ∈ N \ S, player k has
different partners in µ and in µ′.
After the above two remarks, we define a directed graph G with set of nodes N and
the following edges: if i ∈ I and j ∈ J , there is an edge of the type i −→ j if (i, j) ∈ µ,
and there is an edge j −→ i whenever (i, j) ∈ µ′. Notice that at each node i ∈ I we have
exactly one outgoing edge and at most one incoming edge, whereas at each node j ∈ J
there is at most one outgoing edge and exactly one incoming edge. Hence, the graph G
is partitioned in connected components. We can assume without loss of generality that
each component of G is a path, since in case of a cycle (i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , ik, jk, i1) with
ih ∈ I and jh ∈ J for all 1 ≤ h ≤ k, the restrictions of µ and of µ′ to the coalition
R = {i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , ik, jk} are both optimal matchings for R ⊆ T , so we could alter µ′
on R to coincide with µ and apply our second remark.
For each i ∈ S ∩ I, let Ci = (i = i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . , ik, jk) be the maximal path in G
starting at i. Clearly, nodes in S ∩ I can only be starting points of paths in G, since
they cannot have an incoming edge. Notice that such a path ends either at jk ∈ S or at
jk ∈ J \ S not matched by µ′. Notice also that all il in this path, l ∈ {2, . . . , k}, belong
to I \ S. Define now the following matching for (I \ {i1}) ∪ (J \ {jk}):
µ˜ =
⋃
i∈I\Ci1
{(i, µ(i))} ∪
k−1⋃
l=1
{(il+1, jl)}.
In the first case, that is if jk ∈ S, we get
w∗A((i1, jk)) = wA(N)− wA(N \ {i1, jk}) ≤
∑
(i,j)∈µ
aij −
∑
(i,j)∈µ˜
aij
=
k∑
l=1
ailµ(il) −
k−1∑
l=1
ail+1jl =
k∑
l=1
ailµ(il) −
k−1∑
l=1
ail+1µ′(il+1).
(15)
In the second case, that is if jk ∈ J \ S but unmatched by µ′, we also get
w∗A((i1, 0)) = wA(N)− wA(N \ {i1}) ≤
∑
(i,j)∈µ
aij −
∑
(i,j)∈µ˜
aij
=
k∑
l=1
ailµ(il) −
k−1∑
l=1
ail+1µ′(il+1).
(16)
We now show that all pairs (i, j) ∈ µ and (i, j) ∈ µ′ belong to some component Ci′
of G for some i′ ∈ S. Notice first that if j ∈ J \ S, then either µ−1(j) = i ∈ S and
then the edge (i, j) belongs to the component Ci; or µ
−1(j) = i1 ∈ I \S and then, since
|J \S| ≥ |I \S|, i1 is matched by µ′, and we denote µ(i1) = j2 ∈ J \S. Going backwards
we built a chain (jr+1, ir, jr, . . . , i1, j1 = j) with all jl ∈ J \ S, for all l ∈ {1, . . . , r + 1},
such that µ−1(jr+1) = ir+1 ∈ S. Then, the edge (i, j) belongs to the component Cir+1 .
Once we have that all (i, j) ∈ µ with j ∈ J \ S belong to some component Ci′ with
i′ ∈ S, it follows immediately that the edge (µ′−1(j), j) also belongs to Ci′ . Hence, all
pairs (i, j) ∈ µ′ also belong to some component Ci′ . Finally, if we have a pair (i, j) ∈ µ
with j ∈ S, by our initial assumption we can guarantee that i ∈ I \S and then the pair
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(i, µ′(i)) belongs to some component Ci′ for i′ ∈ S. By the construction of the graph,
this implies that the path that reaches i can be continued with the edge (i, j) and hence
also (i, j) ∈ Ci′ .
The above argument means that the components Ci, with i ∈ S form a partition
of the graph G. Let us name S1 = {i ∈ S | Ci ends at j(i) ∈ S} and S2 = {i ∈ S |
Ci ends at j(i) 6∈ S}. Then,
w∗(S) = w(N)− w(N \ S) =
∑
(i,j)∈µ
aij −
∑
(i,j)∈µ′
aij
=
∑
i′∈S1
∑
i∈Ci′
aiµ(i) −
∑
i∈Ci′\{i′}
aiµ′(i)
+ ∑
i′∈S2
∑
i∈Ci′
aiµ(i) −
∑
i∈Ci′\{i′}
aiµ′(i)

≥
∑
i′∈S1
w∗((i′, j(i′))) +
∑
i′∈S2
w∗((i′, 0)),
where the inequality follows from (15) and (16), which completes the proof. 
As a consequence of the above theorem, the set of dual coalitionally rational allo-
cations of an assignment game can be defined only in terms of the dual constraints for
mixed-pair and individual coalitions. Let us define for (extended) matrix A = [aij]i,j∈M0
a dual matrix B = B(A) = [bij]i,j∈M0 consisting of the dual coalitional values bij =
w∗A((i, j)) for all i, j ∈ M0, including b00 = 0 = w∗A((0, 0)). With this notation, the set
of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors in (N,wA) is simply
R∗(N,wA) =
{
(u, v) ∈ RM0 × RM0 : ui + vj ≤ bij for all i, j ∈M0
}
.
Notice that bii = aii for all i ∈M0, so to use this description of R∗(N,wA) (or the dual
description (13) of the core) only the bij = wA(N)−wA(N \{i, j}) values for i 6= j ∈M0
need to be computed from the underlying matrix A.
Recall that the individual and mixed-pair upper bounds collected in matrix B are
attained in the core. Hence no entry in B can be decreased without modifying the core
of the game and B is the minimum matrix among those representing the same core.
Consequently, the dual matrix B satisfies a dual form of the exactness property (12).
Proposition 5 Let (N,wA) be a square assignment game with an optimal matching on
the main diagonal. Then, the dual matrix B = B(A) satisfies
bij + bkk ≤ bik + bkj for all i, j, k ∈M0. (17)
Proof. Let (u, v) ∈ C(N,wA) be the core element that attains, for an arbitrarily
chosen pair i, j ∈ M0, the upper bound bij, that is, ui + vj = bij. Then, bij + bkk =
ui + vj + uk + vk ≤ bik + bkj holds for any k ∈M0. 
We now turn to the question of how to determine the dual matrix B = B(A). The
diagonal entries are obviously bii = aii for all i ∈M0. To obtain the off-diagonal entries
by their definition, we must compute each of the (m+1)m optimum values wA(N\{i, j}),
i 6= j ∈M0. Since solving an m×m assignment optimization problem takes, in general,
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O(m3) time, this straightforward approach would require O(m5) time. Alternatively,
we could use the tightness of the dual upper bounds and obtain bij as the optimum
value of the linear programming problem max{ui + vj : (u, v) ∈ C(N,wA)}, but the
computational complexity of this approach is not known to us. Next we present an
O(m4) method that requires no optimization.
Suppose we already know the (extended) matrix A¯ = [a¯ij]i,j∈M0 of the exact core
lower bounds, that is, for any i, j ∈ M0 there exists a core vector (u, v) such that
ui + vj = a¯ij. Obviously, a¯ii = aii for all i ∈M0. We claim that the matrix of exact core
upper bounds B(A) is given by
bij = a¯ii + a¯jj − a¯ji, for all (i, j) ∈M0 ×M0. (18)
Indeed, for all core vectors (u, v) and all i, j ∈M0 we have ui + vj = ui + vi + uj + vj −
uj − vi ≤ a¯ii + a¯jj − a¯ji. To see that this upper bound is attained, take a core vector
(u, v) for which uj + vi = a¯ji. Thus, a¯ii + a¯jj − a¯ji is the exact upper bound for core
payoffs ui + vj, implying our claim (18).
Notice that it only takes O(m2) elementary operations to obtain matrix B(A) from
matrix A¯ via (18). Combined with the O(m4) algorithm we propose next to compute
A¯ from the initial matrix A, we obtain a method to compute B(A) from A that is
faster than the aformentioned direct approaches. Moreover, our method requires only
elementary operations and no optimization.
Algorithm Cover
Initially, let A0 = AM0×M0 be a square matrix with an optimal matching in the diagonal.
Set r = 1.
Iteration r: compute matrix Ar from matrix Ar−1 as follows:
arij := max
{
ar−1ij , max{ar−1ik + ar−1kj − ar−1kk : k 6= i, j ∈M0}
}
for all i, j ∈M0. (19)
If Ar = Ar−1 then STOP, else set r := r + 1 and start a new iteration.
Output: matrix A¯ = Ar¯ where r¯ is the first r ≥ 1 for which Ar = Ar−1.
In Proposition 6 below we show that the algorithm terminates after a finite number
of iterations, but we need some preparation. Given a square matrix A with an optimal
matching in the diagonal, we say that entry aij is (strictly) majorized by a loop of length
r if there is a sequence of r distinct indices k1, . . . , kr, all of them different from i and
j, such that aij(<) ≤ aik1 − ak1k1 + ak1k2 − ak2k2 + . . . − akrkr + akrj. We say that an
aij-majorizing loop is stronger than another aij-majorizing loop (irrespective of their
length), if its value (= the alternating sum of the loop entries) is higher than the value
of the other loop. We remark that
1. by the optimality of the diagonal, none of its entries aii can be strictly majorized by
any loop, and that a loop which weakly majorizes aii gives an alternative optimal
assignment for A;
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2. the exactness condition (12) means that no entry of the matrix is strictly majorized
by a loop of length 1;
3. the exactness condition (12) implies that no entry of the matrix is strictly ma-
jorized by a loop of any length. Indeed, suppose the strict majorization aij <
aik1 − ak1k1 + ak1k2 − ak2k2 + . . . − akrkr + akrj by a loop of length r ≥ 2. Under
(12), the first three terms of the right hand side is ≤ aik2 , revealing the strict
majorization aij < aik2 − ak2k2 + ak2k3 − . . . − akrkr + akrj by a loop of length
r − 1. Sequentially repeating the above argument reveals the strict majorization
aij < aikr − akrkr + akrj by a loop of length 1, a contradiction to (12).
Now we are ready to show the correctness of the algorithm.
Proposition 6 In algorithm Cover
1. the number of iterations is r¯ ≤ m;
2. the number of elementary operations is O(m4).
Proof. Obviously, for any r ≥ 1, arij ≥ ar−1ij for all i, j ∈ M0, hence the name of the
algorithm. By the above remark 1, the diagonal entries are never increased, arii = a
r−1
ii
for all i ∈M0.
Claim 1 follows from two observations. The first one is that if an entry aij of the
input matrix A0 = AM0×M0 is strictly majorized by a loop that contains an entry apq then
aij can not be part of any loop that (strictly) majorizes apq. Indeed, let, for example,
aij < aik1−ak1k1 +ak1k2−ak2k2 +ak2=p,k3=q−ak3k3 +ak3k4−ak4k4 +ak4j, and at the same
time, apq ≤ aps1 − as1s1 + as1=i,s2=j − as2s2 + as2s3 − as3s3 + as3q. By adding these two
inequalities and cancelling aij + apq from both sides, we get 0 < [aik1 − ak1k1 + ak1k2 −
ak2,k2=p]+[aps1−as1,s1=i]+[−aq=k3,k3+ak3k4−ak4k4+ak4j]+[−aj=s2,s2+as2s3−as3s3+as3,q],
where the first and third brackets contain the terms from the first inequality separated
by apq, while the second and fourth brackets contain the terms from the second inequality
separated by aij. However, the sum of the terms in the first and second brackets is ≤ 0
by the optimality of the diagonal assignment, and similarly, the sum of the terms in the
third and fourth brackets is also ≤ 0 by the same reason. Thus, the sum of the terms
in all four brackets is ≤ 0. This contradiction proves the acyclicity of the (mixed strict
and weak) loop-majorization relation between the matrix entries.
The second observation is that (19) eliminates strict majorizations by loops of length
1 in the current matrix Ar−1. Although it may create strict majorization by loops of
length 1 of the same entry in the updated matrix Ar, but only if a longer and stronger
majorizing loop existed in Ar−1. Indeed, it may even happen that an entry is not
increased in an iteration, but it must be increased in the next or some subsequent
iteration(s). Assume, for example, ar−1ij = a
r
ij, but a
r
ij < a
r+1
ij = a
r
ik1
− ark1k1 + ark1j
because the entry ar−1ik1 < a
r
ik1
= ar−1ik2 − ar−1k2k2 + ar−1k2k1 had to be increased in iteration
r. Substituting arik1 with this loop value in the above expression that defines a
r+1
ij , we
get arij < a
r−1
ik2
− ar−1k2k2 + ar−1k2k1 − ark1k1 + ark1j. By replacing ark1k1 = ar−1k1k1 and ark1j with
its defining expression in (19), we get a strictly majorizing longer loop in Ar−1 that is
stronger than any of the loops of length 1. Since (19) strictly reduces the length of the
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majorizing loops that exist in the current matrix Ar−1, and by definition their length is
at most m, Claim 1 follows.
To see Claim 2, notice that updating an entry by (19) takesO(m) time, O(m2) entries
need to be updated, so each iteration takes O(m3) time. By Claim 1, the number of
iterations is at most m, so algorithm Cover takes O(m4) time. 
Before we prove that algorithm Cover determines matrix A¯ = [a¯ij]i,j∈M0 of the
exact core lower bounds, we illustrate it on the following example.
Example 3 Let the assignment game with row agents I = {1, 2, 3} and columns agents
J = {1′, 2′, 3′} be induced by the following extended matrix A. The value of the grand
coalition is given by the optimal assignment in the diagonal.
A =

0 0 0 0
0 5 2 2
0 6 5 1
0 3 4 3
 .
When computing matrix A1 from the initial A0 = A in iteration r = 1, we find that
matrix A violates the exactness property (12) for several combination of indices, so we
increase, if necessary, the off-diagonal entries of A0 as little as needed to satisfy property
(12). For example, a101 = 1 = max{a002 +a021−a022 = 0 + 6− 5 = 1 , a003 +a031−a033 = 0 +
3−3 = 0}. Similarly, a131 = 5 = max{a021 +a032−a022 = 6+4−5 = 5 , a030 +a001−a000 = 0}.
We get
A1 =

0 1 1 0
0 5 3 2
1 6 5 3
0 5 4 3
 ,
set r := 2, and start a new iteration.
In iteration r = 2 we check whether A1 violates property (12) by computing matrix
A2 and checking whether there is an entry to be increased. There is only one, namely,
a201 = 2 = max{a102 +a121−a122 = 1 + 6− 5 = 2 , a103 +a131−a133 = 0 + 5− 3 = 2}. We get
A2 =

0 2 1 0
0 5 3 2
1 6 5 3
0 5 4 3
 ,
set r := 3, and start a new iteration.
In iteration r = 3 we find that A3 = A2, so it satisfies the exactness property (12).
The algorithm stops after r¯ = 3 (≤ m = 3) iterations.
The reader can easily check that in this example the entries of the output matrix
A3 = A2 are precisely the exact core lower bounds, so indeed A¯ = A3 and the matrix
B =

0 5 4 3
3 5 4 3
4 7 5 4
3 6 5 3

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obtained from A¯ by (18) consists of the exact core upper bounds. Notice that at the
margins we obtained the individual core upper bounds for all players. No optimization
was needed to compute the dual game values. 
Now we show that algorithm Cover determines the exact core lower bounds for
coalitions in family B given in (10). It will be convenient to refer to the solution set
of the system in (11) for any non-negative square matrix AM0×M0 with an optimal
assignment on the main diagonal as the cover of matrix A, and denote it by C(A). Since
we might judiciously think of C(A) as the core of a generalized assignment game (Owen,
1992), where the individual values are not necessarily all zero, but ai0 ≥ 0 for i ∈ I and
a0j ≥ 0 for j ∈ J , using the same notation as for the core of the game should not be
confusing. Naturally, C(A) = C(N,wA) in case AM0×M0 is the standard extension with
zeros of the mixed-pair value matrix AI×J .
Proposition 7 In any iteration 1 ≤ r ≤ r¯ of algorithm Cover,
1. C(Ar) = C(Ar−1) 6= ∅;
2. Ar is diagonal-optimal (i.e. its main diagonal form an optimal assignment).
Proof. We simultaneously prove the claims by induction. Obviously, at the start of
the first iteration r = 1, we have C(Ar−1) 6= ∅ and Ar−1 is diagonal-optimal. Now we
assume that both statements hold at the start of arbitrary iteration r ≥ 1.
To see Claim 1, first recall that arij ≥ ar−1ij for all i, j ∈ M0 by (19), and arii = ar−1ii
for all i ∈ M0 by the diagonal-optimality of Ar−1. This immediately implies C(Ar) ⊆
C(Ar−1). To show the reverse inclusion, take any (u, v) ∈ C(Ar−1) and i, j ∈ M0. Then
we have ui+vj = ui+vk+uk+vj−(uk+vk) ≥ ar−1ik +ar−1kj −ar−1kk for any k 6= i, j ∈M0, and
also ui + vj ≥ ar−1ij , hence ui + vj ≥ arij by (19). On the other hand, ui + vi = ar−1ii = arii
for all i ∈M0, thus C(Ar) ⊇ C(Ar−1) also holds, implying C(Ar) 6= ∅.
To see Claim 2, take any (u, v) ∈ C(Ar) 6= ∅. Then ∑mk=0 arkk = ∑mk=0(uk + vk) =∑
(i,j)∈µ(ui + vj) ≥
∑
(i,j)∈µ a
r
ij for any full matching µ ∈M(I ∪ {0}, J ∪ {0′}), where 0
and 0′ denotes the fictitious row and column player, respectively. 
Notice that the output matrix A¯ = Ar¯ defines the unique generalized assignment
game in sense of Owen (1992) which is exact and has the same core as the original
assignment game induced by the input matrix A.
With the above efficient and elementary way of computing the dual matrix B(A)
at hand, let us see how to use it to obtain the set of extreme core allocations of an
assignment game.
Theorem 1 shows that, given an assignment game (N,wA), the lemaral payoff vectors
are computed from expression (8) with D = B defined in (10). In order to be consistent
with our conventions in representing a single player as a mixed pair with the artificial
player of the other type, we need to adjust the general definitions as follows. Let
I0 = I ∪ {0} and J0 = J ∪ {0′} denote the extended sets of row and column players,
respectively. We will consider only those orders of the extended player set N0 = I0∪J0 in
which the first two positions are occupied by the artificial players 0 and 0′. Let Π0(N0)
20
denote their set. Notice that the orders in Π0(N0) are in one-to-one correspondence with
the orders in Π(N), thus |Π0(N0)| = (2m)! although |N0| = 2m+ 2.
The lemarals are obtained from the dual matrix BM0×M0 in the following way. For
each order σ ∈ Π0(N0), the corresponding lemaral rσ,wA ∈ RN0 is iteratively defined by
rσ,wAσ1 = r
σ,wA
σ2
= 0 and, for all k = 3, . . . , 2m+ 2 by
rσ,wAσk =
{
minj∈J0∩Pσσk{bσkj − r
σ,wA
j } if σk ∈ I,
mini∈I0∩Pσσk{biσk − r
σ,wA
i } if σk ∈ J. (20)
Recall that we require P σσ3 = {0, 0′}. Notice that expression (20) is indeed the special-
ization of (8) with D = B to assignment games, thus for each order σ ∈ Π0(N0), the
corresponding payoff vector is indeed the lemaral rσ,wA .
Since assignment games are ONTO-marginal (Hamers et al., 2002), a consequence of
Proposition 3 is that assignment games are also ONTO-lemaral, that is, each extreme
core allocation is a lemaral payoff vector. The next theorem shows that assignment
games are also INTO-lemaral.
Theorem 2 Let (N,wA) be the assignment game induced by matrix AM0×M0. For each
order σ ∈ Π0(N0), the lemaral payoff vector rσ,wA is an extreme point of C(N,wA).
Proof. Since any lemaral which is in the core is an extreme point of the core, we only
need to show that all lemarals are in the core. Since for each σ ∈ Π0(N0) we have rσ,wA ∈
R∗(N,wA) by definition, we only need to check efficiency to prove rσ,wA ∈ C(N,wA). To
make notation easier, let us write rσ,wA = (u, v).
To this end, let µ = {(k, k) : k ∈ M0} be an optimal matching in A. By definition,
rσ,wAk = 0 for both k = 0 and k = 0
′, so u0 + v0 = b00. Now take a pair (k, k) for some
k ∈ M . Let us assume without loss of generality that σ−1(µ(k)) > σ−1(k), i.e. row
player k precedes column player k′. We want to prove that bkk − uk ≤ bik − ui for all
i ∈ P σµ(k)∩I0, which means that bkk−uk is the minimum in (20) for vk = rσ,wAµ(k) , implying
uk + vk = bkk.
To this end, take any i ∈ P σµ(k)∩I0, and assume that uk = bkj−vj for some j ∈ P σk ∩J0.
We consider two cases. If σ−1(i) > σ−1(j) then j ∈ P σi ∩ J0 and
bkk − uk = bkk − (bkj − vj) ≤ bik − (bij − vj) ≤ bik − ui,
where the first inequality follows from bij + bkk ≤ bik + bkj, which holds by Proposition
5, and the second inequality from ui + vj ≤ bij.
Otherwise, that is, if σ−1(i) < σ−1(j), then vj ≤ bij − ui and hence
bkk − uk = bkk − bkj + vj ≤ bkk − bkj + bij − ui ≤ bik − ui,
where the last inequality follows again from Proposition 5. 
The above theorem also enables us to simplify the computation of the lemarals.
Since any lemaral is now proved to be in the core of the assignment game, once we
determine the payoff to a player in (20), the payoff to his optimally assigned partner
is also determined by their efficiency equation uk + vk = bkk = akk. The next example
illustrates this simplified way of computing the lemarals.
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Example 4 Consider the assignment game and its dual matrix B in Example 3. We
compute the lemaral rσ related to the order σ = (3′, 3, 2′, 2, 1, 1′) (for brevity, we omit
the artificial players in the first two positions, since always rσ0 = 0 and r
σ
0′ = 0):
rσ3′ = b03 = 3 and r
σ
3 = 3− 3 = 0,
rσ2′ = min{b02, b32 − rσ3} = 4 and rσ2 = 5− 4 = 1,
rσ1 = max{b10, b12 − rσ2′ , b13 − rσ3′} = 0 and rσ1′ = 5− 0 = 5.
Hence, rσ = (0, 1, 0; 5, 4, 3). It is easily checked to be the extreme core allocation that
gives all sellers their core minimum payoffs, see the output matrix A2. 
Having seen that for assignment games the set of extreme core allocations coincides
with the set of lemarals, and thus by Proposition 4 with the set of lemacols, we get that
Algorithm COVER together with (18) and (20) give a simple and quite efficient way
to compute the extreme core allocations, or the lemacols, directly from the extended
matrix A0.
In order to further emphasize the relevance of Theorem 2, we give a game whose core
shows very strong similarities with the core of an assignment game, but has an extreme
core element that is neither a lemacol, nor a lemicol vector.
Example 5 Consider the 6-player game (N, v) with
v(S) =

12 if S = N
4 if S = 14, 25, 36
3 if S = 23
4 if S = 123, 126
0 if S = else
In any core allocation x1 + x4 = 4, x2 + x5 = 4, x3 + x6 = 4, so we can picture
the core in the (x1, x2, x3)-space, see Figure 1. Moreover, xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 6, thus the
(projection to that space of the) core is included in the box 0 ≤ xi ≤ 4, i = 1, 2, 3.
The inequality x1 +x2 +x3 ≥ 4 cuts off corner (0, 0, 0), the inequality x1 +x2 +x6 ≥ 4
cuts off corner (0, 0, 4). These two planes intersect in the line segment joining the points
(0, 2, 2) (the midpoint of the left-side square), and (2, 0, 2) (the midpoint of the front
side-square). The inequality x2 +x3 ≥ 3 cuts off this latter point and the corner (4, 0, 0).
The above-mentioned three planes intersect in the point (1, 1, 2).
The point (1, 1, 2) is an extreme point of the core (it makes 6 linearly independent
core inequalities binding). All other core extreme points (shown) are on the sides of the
box (at least one of their coordinates is 0 or 4, the core-minimum or the core-maximum
payoff, respectively, for each variable). Therefore, the core extreme point (1, 1, 2) is
neither a lemacol, nor a lemicol. It cannot even be obtained by any mixed sequence of
maximization / minimization within a given order (e.g. max for the first player, min for
the second and for the third, again max for the fourth, etc.).
Notice, however, that because of the dichotomous relation between the pairs of pay-
offs xi and x3+i = 4− xi for i = 1, 2, 3 inside the core, all but the (1, 1, 2) core extreme
points are actually lemacols (and also lemicols). 
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x1
x2
x3
(1, 3, 0) (4, 3, 0)
(4, 4, 0)
(4, 0, 4)
(4, 0, 3)
(3, 0, 3)
(4, 4, 4)(0, 4, 4)
(0, 4, 0)
(0, 2, 2) (1, 1, 2)
(2, 0, 2)
Figure 1: The (projection of the) core in Example 5
6 A concluding remark for the Alexia value
An immediate consequence of the above results regarding the computation of the lemar-
als is that we have obtained an easy way to compute the average of all lemacol payoff
vectors, that is the Alexia value.
As the reader will realize after computing several lemarals for our Example 4, many
of them coincide. The reason is that once the payoff to an agent in a given order σ
is fixed, the position that his optimally assigned partner occupies among his followers
does not matter. Thus we can restrict ourselves to those orders where optimally assigned
partners are consecutive. Let µ be an optimal assignment, µ ∈M∗A(I, J), and define
Π˜(N) =
{
σ ∈ Π(N) : for all i ∈ I, if σ−1(i) = r then σ−1(µ(i)) ∈ {r − 1, r + 1}} .
Notice that for (m + m)-player assignment games, i.e. when |N = I ∪ J | = 2m, the
cardinality of Π˜(N) is m! · 2m, much less than (2m)!, the cardinality of Π(N). In the
above (3 + 3)-player example, we would only need to consider 48 orders instead of 720.
For (4 + 4)-player assignment games, the respective numbers are 384 versus 40320.
In light of the above remark, the expression of the Alexia value for assignment game
(N,wA) can be rewritten as follows:
α(wA) =
1
m! · 2m
∑
σ∈Π˜(N)
rσ,wA . (21)
The inequalities m! · 2m < m! · mm < (2m)! and the fact that it is more efficient to
compute a lemaral than a marginal payoff vector show that for assignment games the
Alexia value is computationally far more tractable than the Shapley value. Moreover, we
believe that the number of orders for which the lemaral is computed in (21) can be further
decreased. Since the number of extreme core points in an (m + m)-player assignment
game is at most
(
2m
m
)
(Balinski and Gale, 1987), and
(
2m
m
)
< (m+ 1)! ≤ m! · 2m, several
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lemacols related to orders even in Π˜(N) must coincide in the same extreme core point.
Further studies are needed to see how these groups of orders (and their multiplicity)
could be determined.
References
[1] Balinski ML, Gale D (1987) On the core of the assignment game. In: Functional
Analysis, Optimization, and Mathematical Economics, ed. Leifman LJ, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York, 274-289.
[2] Biswas A, Parthasarathy T, Potters JAM, Voorneveld M (1999) Large cores and
exactness. Games and Economic Behavior, 20:1-12.
[3] Demange G (1982) Strategyproofness in the assignment market game. Mimeo, Lab-
oratoire d’Econome´trie de l’E´cole Politechnique, Paris.
[4] Este´vez-Ferna´ndez A (2012) New characterizations for largeness of the core. Games
and Economic Behavior 76: 160-180.
[5] Gellekom JRG van, Potters JAM, Reijnierse JH (1999) Prosperity properties of
TU-games. International Journal of Game Theory, 28:211-227.
[6] Ichiishi, T (1981) Supermodularity: applications to convex games and to the greedy
algorithm for LP. Journal of Economic Theory, 25:283-286.
[7] Izquierdo JM, Nu´n˜ez M, Rafels C (2007) A simple procedure to obtain the extreme
core allocations of an assignment market. International Journal of Game Theory,
36:17-26.
[8] Leonard HB (1983) Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individ-
uals to positions. Journal of Political Economy, 91: 461-479.
[9] Hamers H, Klijn F, Solymosi T, Tijs S, Villar JP (2002) Assignment games satisfy
the CoMa-property. Games and Economic Behavior, 38:231-239.
[10] Kuipers J (1993) On the core of information graph games. International Journal of
Game Theory, 21:339-350.
[11] Kongo T, Funaki Y, Branzei R, Tijs S (2010) Non-cooperative and axiomatic char-
acterizations of the average lexicographic value. International Game Theory Review,
12(4):417-435. (doi: 10.1142/S0219198910002751)
[12] Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz J, Nu´n˜ez M, Rafels C (2011) Assignment markets with the
same core. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2): 553-563.
[13] Nu´n˜ez M, Rafels C (2002) Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game. Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 31:423-436.
[14] Owen, G. (1992) The assignment game: The reduced game. Annales D’Economie
et de Statistique, 25/26:71-79.
24
[15] Shapley LS (1971) Cores of convex games. International Journal of Game Theory,
1:11-26.
[16] Shapley LS, Shubik M (1972) The assignment game I: The core. International
Journal of Game Theory, 1:111-130.
[17] Solymosi T, Raghavan T (2001) Assignment games with stable core. International
Journal of Game Theory, 30:177-185.
[18] Tijs S, Borm P, Lohmann E, Quant M (2011) An average lexicographic value for
cooperative games. European Journal of Operational Research, 213:210-220.
25
